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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 7 JUNE, 1953 NUMBER 4
FLORIDA'S LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE
IRVING STEINHARDT*
AND
TOBrIAS SIMON * '
INTRODUCTION
". It may be safely remarked that no science is more dependent
upon the accuracy of its terms and definitions than that of the
law. Looseness of language and dicta in judicial opinions either
silently acquiesced in or perpetuated by inadvertent repetition
often insiduously exert their influence until they result in con-
fusing the application of the law or themselves become crystalized
into a kind of authority which the Courts without reference to
principal are constrained to follow." Chief Justice Shepherd in
Smith v. Norfolk S. & R. Company, 114 N.C. 228, 19 S.E. 863,
869 (1894).
In 1933 the Florida Supreme Court first expressly enunciated that
the last clear chance doctrine was a part of Florida jurisprudence,' and in
a series of cases the doctrine was defined and its boundaries were outlined.
The language of these cases when considered together with their facts seems
at times confusing, and the confusion is due in no small measure to a failure
to accurately define the terms peculiarly associated with the doctrine. In
addition, there was a failure on the part of the court to grasp and enunciate
the basic reason for the doctrine. In this the Florida court was not alone
among the courts of this country. However, from the results of the cases,
certain conclusions can be drawn as to what the law on last clear chance
is in Florida. This is an attempt to present those conclusions.
The common law requires that one who has failed to use the care that
an ordinary and prudent man would use under all the circumstances, and
thereby has caused injury to another or his property, must pay the other for
the injuries he has inflicted.2 However, not all negligent conduct resulting
in damage gives rise to liability for damages. The one who has been harmed
may have engaged in some conduct which will bar his recovery. The most
often used and most effective defense in suits against negligent defendants
is that of contributory negligence, or the failure of the plaintiff to use the
* B.S., 1948, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; LL.B., 1952, Harvard
University; Member of District of Columbia and Florida Bars.
** B.A., 1949, Hofstra College; LL.B., 1952, Harvard University; Member of
Florida Bar.
1. Merchants' Transportation Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So, 401 (1933).
2. RESTAiEMENT, TORTS § 281 (1934).
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care an ordinary and prudent man would use under all the circumstances
to protect himself against the injuries which have resulted.a When a
defendant is successful in establishing the defense of contributory negli-
gence, it serves as a complete bar to recovery.4
The effect of such a rule has at timcs seemed to place an undue hard-
ship on the plaintiff. The application of the doctrine of contributory
negligence is undeviating. No matter how small a departure the plaintiff
may take from the standards of due care required of him, lie must stand
the cost of his injuries even if the defendant's conduct was much more
flagrant than his own. Quite understandably then, the courts would tend
to manufacture legal devices which would avoid the consequences of con-
tributory negligence in certain cases.' The doctrine of last clear chance
seems to be one result of judicial reaction against the oppressive effects
of the contributory negligence doctrine.
The doctrine of last clear chance exists in Florida to modify the rule
that a negligent plaintiff cannot recover,"
In this respect its operation may be regarded as an exception to the
general rules of negligence. In the broader view however, it should be
stated that contributory negligence does not necessarily bar recovery in
3. Ibid.
4. RESrATEMENT, rors § 467 (1934).
5. One such technique is to divide negligence into degrees: wilful negligence,
gross negligence, and ordinary negligence (or similar categories), and then to hold
that ordinary contributory negligence is no defense to some of the snore flagrant types
of negligence.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that contributory negligence is no defense to
"wilful negligence". Florida Southern Ry. v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892);
see Florida Ry. v. Dorsey, 59 FIa. 260, 52 So. 963 (1910). It is a defense to gross
negligence. Florida Southern Ry. v. Hirst, sup~ra.
The most satisfactory method for dealing with the harsh effects of the con-
tributory negligence doctrine is to deduct from the plaintiff's damages that amount
which his carelessness contributed to the impact as compared to the total carelessness
causing the accident, i.e., a sharing of the loss by both the plaintiff and the defendant
according to how much each one's negligence has contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.
Such apportionment of damages was unknown to the common law, but has been
provided for by statute in certain cases. See Fi5. STA'. §§ 768.06, 769.03 (1951)
It seems that some courts have completely overlooked that the purpose of'such
comparative negligence statutes is to apportion damages according to fault and have
held, when the facts warrant the application of the last clear chance doctrine, the
apportionment provisions of the statutes are inapplicable, and the defendant who had
the last clear chance to avoid the accident has to bear the entire burden of the resultant
injury. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Simpson, 184 Ark. 633, 43 S.W.2d 251 (1921);
Barnes v. Red River & G. Ry., 14 La. App. 188, 128 So. 724 (1940); Watts v. Pere
Marquette Ry., 231 Mich. 40, 203 N.W. 859 (1925). See Owen v. Kurn, 347 Mo.
516, 148 S.W. 519 (1941); Bole v. lines, 226 S.V. 272 (Mo. 1920).
Apparently the Florida Supreme Court does not take such a view of their statutes
providing for apportionment. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Britton, 109 Fla. 212, 146
So. 842 (1933); Kenan v. Withers, 137 Fla. 561, 188 So. 95 (1930); Florida Central
& P. Ry. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899). But see the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Davis in Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Britton, 109 la, 212, 217, 146 So.
842, 843 (1933).
6. Consumer's Lumber and Veneer Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 117 F.2d 329
(5th Cir. 1943); Schoen v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 135 F.2d 967 (5th Cir.
1941); Davis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471, 1 So.2d 47; (1941); Lindsay v. Thomas, 128
Fla. 293, 174 So. 418 (1937).
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
every instance and that the situations involving the doctrine of last clear
chance constitutes one such instance. In this light, last clear chance is an
extension of the law of contributory negligence, not an exception to it.7
Without attempting at this time to define the various elements of the
last clear chance doctrine, the following situation has been hypothesized
to which the doctrine would be almost universally applicable.
High above a wide river is a railroad trestle. Barnes negligently decides
to take a stroll across this trestle, although he notes that its height would
prevent him from jumping and its narrowness would prevent him from
moving out of the path of an approaching train. When he is halfway
across, a train enters the trestle. At the time the engineer sees Barnes
he is able to stop the train. Negligently he accelerates, rather than brakes,
the train so that the available opportunity to stop is lost. Barnes is injured.
In his suit against the railroad company, despite the admission of his own
negligence, Barnes recovers for his injuries on the theory that the railroad
company failed to utilize its last clear chance to prevent impact. s
In this situation a negligent plaintiff recovers damages from a negligent
defendant. Since this rule of liability is contrary to ordinary concepts of
torts, there are evidently factors within the hypothetical siuation which take
it out of the ordinary rule of contributory negligence.
It is to be noted that:
1. The plaintiff was negligent.
2. His negligence had placed him in a position from which he could
not extricate himself.
3. The defendant actually saw the plaintiff.
4. He recognized that the plaintiff could not avoid an impact by
escaping from the danger.
5. When the defendant first appreciated this dangerous situation
he could have avoided an impact by then exercising due care.
6. He failed to exercise the necessary care at that particular mo-
ment.
In short, these factors show the existence of the superior opportunity
in the defendant to have avoided the accident at the time the presence
of the plaintiff was discovered.
It is this superior opportunity, as represented by some or all of the
above listed elements, which characterizes the doctrinc of last clear chance.
As stated, the existence of this superior opportunity allows recovery by a
negligent plaintiff."
7. "The last clear chance doctrine is not an exception to the general doctrine
of contributory negligence. It does not permit one to recover in spite of his contributory
negligence, but merely operates to relieve the negligence of a plaintiff . . . which
would otherwise be regarded as contributory, from its character as such." Merchants'
Transportation Co. v. Daniel, 109 Ha. 496, 502, 149 So. 401, 403 (1933).
8. Cf. Barnes v. Red River & G. Ry., 14 La. App. 188, 128 So. 724 (1930).
See also example listed in Merchants' Transportation Co. v. Daniel, note I supra.
9. See note 6 supra.
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The reasons broached for this modification of the rules of con-
tributory negligence have been many. Unfortunately, no theory yet
presented can be regarded as fully satisfactory. The Supreme Court of
Florida, as well as courts in other jurisdictions, has attempted to lay a logical
foundation for this rule.
Perhaps the most popular explanation in Florida is that, by the
existence of the defendant's superior opportunity to prevent impact, the
plaintiff's negligence becomes "immaterial" or "remote".
In the ease of Merchants' Transportation Co. v. Daniel'0 it was stated:
This result (allowing recovery by a negligent plaintiff] it [the doc-
trine of last clear chance] accomplishes by characterizing the negli-
gence of the defendant if it intervenes between the negligence of
the plaintiff or deceased and the accident as the sole proximate
cause of the injury and the plaintiff's antecedent negligence merely
as a condition or remote cause. The antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff or deceased having been thus relegated to the position of
a condition or remote cause of the accident, it cannot be regarded
as contributory since it is well established that negligence in order
to be contributory must be one of the proximate causes."
The Florida court has also stated:
The gist of the rule is that the jury ascertain whose negligent act
was the immediate cause of the injury. The commission of the
last or immediate negligent act renders all antecedent acts of
negligence remote and immaterial.12
It seems apparent that what is meant by so characterizing the negli-
gence of the plaintiff as "remote" is that it is of a quality whereby it
would not create liability, or as it would normally be termed, "not prox-
imate".
This, of course, is not true. First, the negligence of the plaintiff con-
tributes in some measure to the impact. That is, there is no separate and
distinct intervening event so that the impact would have occurred regard-
less of the action of the plainiff. In every case it is indisputable that had
the plaintiff not been negligent there would have been no impact. Second,
the negligence of the plaintiff is actionable and does cause damage within
the risk created by this negligence, or is what is commonly called the
proximate cause of the injury. Suppose that negligent plaintiff does recover
for his injuries from a negligent driver who possessed a superior opportunity
to prevent impact. This fact will not deny recovery by an injured passenger
of the defendant from the plaintiff whose negligence has been so loosely
termed "remote".
Thus the plaintiff's negligence is remote for some purposes, and prox-
imate for others. This terminology, for practical purposes, is not a valid
basis for the operation of the last clear chance doctrine.
10. See note I sura.
11. Merchants' Transportation Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 502, 149 So. 401,
403 (19 3). Bracketed material supplied.
Q2. Williams v. Sauls, 151 Fla. 270, 274, 9 So.2d 369, 371 (1942).
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It has further been pointed out that last clear chance is used to
relieve the negligent plaintiff of the bar to his recovery because the defend-
ant has wilfully caused the impact by not utilizing his superior opportunity
to prevent it.' 3  Such language is unfortunate. Wilfulness or intent is
not here involved. By definition the defendant's failure to prevent the
impact is negligence only. The defendant does not intend to ride down
a negligent but helpless victim in his path. Had he done so, an inten-
tional tort arises to which contributory negligence is not a bar.' 4 Rather
the defendant is merely negligent - generally no more so than the plaintiff.
Wherein then lies the rationale of the last clear chance doctrine? What
exists in the factors constituting the concept to allow recovery by a negligent
plaintiff? Why must it be necessary to charge the jury to consider that
even if the plaintiff were the sine qua non of, and contributed to, his own
injury he can nevertheless recover in full for the injury he sustained after
the impact? Merely stating that the defendant had a superior opportunity,
or last chance, to avoid the accident is not the reason; it is the result. It is
clear that advantage was not taken of this superior opportunity because of
the defendant's negligence. In any event, is the negligence of the defendant
so gross that the wrong of the plaintiff can be ignored? 'Were the law other
than that a contributorily negligent plaintiff is barred, the answer to this last
question might be answered affirmatively. However, the case is otherwise.
Paradoxically, it appears that simply because the negligent plaintiff
is normally denied relief that the effect of the last clear chance doctrine
has been so eagerly, and sometimes so irrationally, accepted.
The absence of a logical basis for the doctrine has not been disturb-
ing in view of the ends which last clear chance serves. The dislike of the
bench to deny relief to negligent plaintiffs harmed by the more serious
negligence of the defendant is apparent. Where it can be shown that
among the commissions and omissions caused by the defendant's negli-
gence was the failure to utilize a conjectural opportunity to prevent impact,
this negligence is immediately branded as qualitatively different from
any other act of negligence. It then becomes possible to switch the
entire burden of compensation from the plaintiff to the defendant. This
result is readily acceptable, and logical reasons therefor are not fastidiously
demanded.
In truth, a defendant's breach of duty to a negligent plaintiff by
failure to utilize an opportunity to prevent an impact is no more serious
than his failure to use due care in any other situation.
There is much to dislike in awarding a negligent plaintiff nothing.
13. "The doctrine of 'last clear chance' has been recognized by this court ....
It is founded upon reasons humane which forbid a wrongdoer from taking advantage
of the perilous position of his fellow man to inflict injury and escape responsibility."
Davis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471, 472, 1 So.2d 475, 476 (1951).
14. Florida Southern Ry. v. Hirst, 30 Fla. I, 11 So. 506 (1892). See Florida
Ry. v. Dorsey, 59 Fla. 260, 52 So. 963 (1910).
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However, awarding the same plaintiff full compensation because of the
defendant's failure to utilize a superior opportunity is little better.'-'
Nevertheless, the operation of the doctrine of last clear chance is
with us. Once it is appreciated that its basis for existence is a certain
sympathy for the negligent plaintiff, this fact can be used as a means of
drawing the many distinctions that are extant in this field of law.
THE ELEMENTAL FACTORS OF LAST' CLEAR CHANCE
Negligence of the Plaintiff
It is apparent that the plaintiff must be negligent)" The doctrine only
applies when the defense of contributory negligence is raised. 7 If the plain-
tiff is not negligent, then the sole issue is the defendant's negligence and this
negligence may be of any conceivable type of commission or omission which
in itself creates a risk of harm to others. When the plaintiff himself is
alleged to have been negligent, lie may use as a weapon in his battle for
recoverv the fact that the defendant is guilty of that very specialized type
of negligence known as the failure to utilize the last clear chance to
avoid the injury.'8 The character and result of the plaintiff's negligence
is of extreme importance in certain situations which will be more closely
considered below.
Negligence of the Defendant in Failing to Avoid an Impact
In order to invite the operation of the doctrine of last clear chance
the negligence of the defendant must be of the peculiar character of carry-
ing the defendant past the point where, but for his negligence, he could
15. PRossER ON TORrs 416 (1941).
16. Yousko v. Vogt, 63 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1953); Davis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471,
I So.2d 475, 476 (1941).
17. Technically, only the plaintiff should be able to avail himself of the theory of
last clear chance, since the defendant has no need for such a defense. If both the
defendant and the plaintiff are negligent, the plaintiff cannot prevail, unless the defend-
ant had the last clear chance to avoid the impact. If the facts are the same, but the
defendant did not have a superior opportunity to prevent impact, it is only important
that the plaintiff be negligent to prevent recovery. 'fint the negligence of the
plaintiff consists partially or entirely of a failure to prevent impact merely defines the
quality of the negligence that has already denied his recovery. Referring to the
plaintiff's negligence as a failure to utilize a last clear chance only serves to add con-
fusion to the doctrine. However, the case of Miami Beach Ry. v. Dobme, 131 Fla.
171, 178, 179 So. 166, 169 (1938) did not take this view, and speaks of a plaintiff
having the last clear chance. 'l'he court held that failure to give the following charge
as requested by the defendant was reversible error.
A motorist who drives on to a street car track is chargeable with seeing
that which lie is bound, as an average person in the exercise of ordinary care,
to see, had lie looked. A motorist who is struck by a street car, which he
had ample opportunity to see, in time to avoid a collision, and did not, is
contributorily negligent.
It would appear that the court correctly reversed for failure to so instruct the jury.
However, it is to be noted that the defendant claimed the acts of the plaintiff made
the plaintiff contributorily negligent. There was no request that the jury be instructed
on the plaintiff's last clear chance. 'lhe court, however, chose to decide the case on the
basis of the plaintiff's alleged last clear chance.
18. Must the doctrine of last clear chance be raised in the pleading? It is not
necessary that the doctrine be pleaded if the situation warrants instructions thereon.
Miller v. Ungar, 149 Fla. 79, 5 So.2d 59S (1941); Becker v. Blum, 142 Fla. 60, 194 So.
275, (1940); Dunn Bus Service v. McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937).
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have prevented the impact. It is instfficient that an automobile driver
was drunk, going too fast, asleep or participated in other actions unknown
to the reasonable man. Indeed, such actions are not necessary or even
important. Insofar as the doctrine is concerned, it is only important
that the defendant be, at the time, in a position to prevent the impact
and thereafter fail to use due care to do so. Since, in the course of events,
it is always possible to state that at one particular point or other the
accident could have been avoided, it is vital that the point at which the
defendant was legally required to take steps to prevent the collision be
clearly defined. For the present we will assume the existence of such an
instant when the defendant realizes the plaintiff is in danger of being struck.
At the time when the law requires action by the defendant so as to
prevent a subsequent impact, it must be physically possible for a reasonable
man to do so.
In Humphries v. Boersma " it was held that the doctrine of last
clear chance was inapplicable because when the defendant became aware,
or should have become aware, of the plight of the defendant there was
no time then to prevent the impact.
211
Similarly, though the defendant would be physically able to prevent
impact were he in complete control of his senses the fact that the
emergency deprived him of his full faculties does not necessarily place
him at fault for failure to avoid the inpact.
This is merely an application of the general rule of conduct in
emergencies to the last clear chance doctrine. The sudden emergency
rule is to the effect that "persons placed in sudden peril by the negligence
of others are not held to the same degree of presence of mind and care-
fulness which is justly required under ordinary circumstances .... ,,21
Where a sudden emergency causes a defendant to become involved in
an accident which hc otherwise would have had the last clear chance to
avoid, it has been distinctly stated that the doctrine of last clear chance
is inapplicable and the defendant is not liable..
2 2
19. 190 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1951).
20. Suppose the physical impossibility results from tle defendant's negligence which
occurred some time before the point of discovery, as for instance, where the engineer
of a train sees an automobile which has been negligently stalled on the railroad track.
He applies his brake in sufficient time to avert the accident, but strikes the automobile
because his brakes are defective. A few courts in this country have applied the last
clear chance doctrine in such a situation and have held the defendant liable despite the
fact that there was no chance physically to avert the accident after the moment of
discover. In such a situation, the case should be treated as the usual one with the
issues of negligence and contributory negligence raised. There is literally no last clear
chance to avoid the accident and there is no reason to distinguish between the plaintiff's
and the defendant's negligence. See RESTArEMET, TORTS, § 479(g).
21. Hull v. Laine, 127 Fla. 433, 440, 173 So. 159, 161 (1937); Cook v. Lewis K.
Liggett Co., Inc., 127 Fla. 369, 173 So. 159 (1937).
22. "'. . . if one finds himself in a position of sudden peril and acts as a person
of ordinary prudence would act under the circumstances, the jury may find him free
from negligence or contributoy negligence although he might have been able to avoid
the accident under less pressing circumstances." Car and General Ins. Corp. v. Keal
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The Point at Which the Defendant Has the Last Clear Chance
At what point does the law impose upon the defendant the duty to
exercise due care to avoid impact with the negligent plaintiff? It has
been briefly pointed out that the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's
position is the important factor. This however is not the complete answer,
since embodied within the legal definition of knowledge is the concept
of implied knowledge. That is, in addition to what the defendant actually
knows is that which he should have known under the circumstances.
Further, knowledge implies more than a single concept. It consists of
visual or other sensory contact, and mental appreciation of what this
contact provides.
The courts have singularly failed to realize the complexity of their
own meaning of knowledge and have used the word without regard to
which of its particular aspects they were then concerned. Since it is the
defendant's knowledge which determines whether the defendant had a last
clear chance, it is here proposed for the sake of discussion to divide the
concept into its various meanings.
A. The Defendant's Knowledge. Actual sensory contact plus mental
appreciation of its import: When the defendant actually sees the plaintiff
or is physically alerted to the fact of the plaintiff's presence and further
realizes or should realize that the plaintiff is in danger of being struck,
the defendant is under the duty to take all reasonable precautions to
prevent the impact. It is at this moment of discovery that the law
requires the defendant to take advantage of his opportunities, and a negli-
gent failure to do so will result in liability, despite the plaintiff's own
negligience.
The sensory contact in most cases has been visual. In Dunn Bus
Service Inc. v. McKinley23 the litigation arose from the collision of the
defendant's bus with the plaintiff's automobile at an intersection. The
plaintiff's own testimony showed that she was negligent in failing to
keep a look out as she drove her car around a comer, thus cutting in
front of the defendant's bus which stuck the rear of her automobile.
However, there was testimony tending to show that the accident could
have been avoided by the bus driver if he had swerved his bus, slowed
down, or applied his brakes. The testimony further tended to show
that the bus driver actually saw the plaintiff. It was held that the lower
court did not commit error by charging the jury on the last clear chance
doctrine.
In Panama City Transit Co. v. DuVernoy4 plaintiff on a motorcycle
and the defendant's bus were appioaching each other on the same street
near an intersection. It appears that the bus arrived at the intersection
Driveway Co., 132 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1943); Schoen v. Wcstern Union Tele-
graph Co., 135 1-.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1941).
23. 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937).
24. 147 Fla. 320, 33 So.2d 48 (1948).
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first and nearly stopped, but started again in order to make a turn, thereby
hitting the plaintiff's motorcycle. The plaintiff was traveling at an
excessive rate of speed. The Florida Supreme Court assumed that the bus
driver saw the plaintiff on his motorcycle and held that the case was prop-
erly submitted to the jury under the last clear chance doctrine to decide
whether the defendant's driver could have avoided the accident by stopping
to wait until the plaintiff passed.
It is not essential that the defendant actually see the plaintiff. It is
enough that he somehow be alerted to the fact of the plaintiff's dangerous
position, and appreciate it. In Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Martin25 plaintiff's
decedent was killed at a railroad crossing when his truck was struck by
the defendant's train. The engineer of the train never saw the truck but
the fireman on the train "hollered to the engineer" and gave him a hand
signal, thereby alerting him to the fact of the plaintiff's position and pre-
dicament. The case went to the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance,
and the court affirmed on appeal. In addition to discovery, it is essential
that there be a reasonable awareness of the plaintiff's situation.
Last clear chance implies thought, appreciation, mental direction,
and the lapse of sufficient time to effectually act upon the impulse
to save another from injury 2
If mental appreciation of the situation is lacking the doctrine of last clear
chance does not apply despite the fact that the defendant was discovered.
It must be noted that the appreciation need not be actual, but if the
circumstances are such that a reasonable man would realize the plaintiff's
predicament, then there is sufficient mental appreciation to bring the case
within the last clear chance doctrine if all the other requisites are present.
It must also be noted that appreciation or realization of the plaintiff's
situation must exist before there is any application of a last clear chance
doctrine tinder any circumstances.
If, however, the defendant does not realize or does not have reason
to realize the plaintiff's dangerous situation or inattentiveness ...
then defendant is not chargeable with liability.2'
In Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co.28 the lower court directed a verdict under
the following set of facts: The plaintiff and another boy were riding their
horses in a lane adjacent to a highway at a fast pace. After the plaintiff
had overtaken the defendant's truck, which was then traveling along the
highway, the plaintiff suddenly turned on to the highway and ran his
horse into the defendant's truck. It was contended that the defendant's
employee driving the truck "could have discovered and realized plaintiff's
perilous situation in sufficient time to avoid the accident by the exercise
25. 56 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1952).
26. Merchants' Transportation Go. v. Daniel, 109 Mla. 496, 504, 149 So. 401, 404
(1933).
27. Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co., 147 Fla. 320, 323, 2 So.2d 586, 587 (1941).
28. 147 Fla. 320, 2 So.2d 586 (1941).
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of reasonable diligence and care."291 The court's answer was that
there was nothing in the situation to indicate that the boys were doing
anything more than staging a race, and that the defendant had no reason
to anticipate that the plaintiff would turn and run into his truck. They
held that it was not error to direct a verdict for the defendant in this
situation. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court has established the necessity
of appreciation before the last clear chance doctrine comes into operation.
In the situation where the defendant actually is aware of the plaintiff's
position, appreciates it and then fails to use due care to avert an impact,
the defendant's opportunity to avoid the accident might very well be
termed an actual last clear chance. Under this actual last clear chance
doctrine the position of the plaintiff is immaterial. He may be merely
inattentive as the woman driver in the Dunn Bus Service case,30 or using
bad judgment as the motorcyclist in the Panama City Transit case,81 or
helplessly unable to extricate himself from his position.
32
Although there is probably no logical justification for the actual last
clear chance doctrine, as stated before, there is a certain amount of judicial
resentment against the contributory negligence doctrine which tips the
scales in favor of a negligent plaintiff who is seen and who would have
escaped injury had the defendant used due care. Perhaps, too, there is
an unconscious feeling that when a defendant actually sees the plaintiff
and fails to avoid hitting him when he could have done so, the defend-
ant's conduct takes on the character of wanton and wilful misconduct.33
'[he effect of these perhaps intuitive feelings converts failure to utilize an
actual last clear chance by the defendant into a type of negligence to which
the plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery.
B. The Defendant's Knowledge: Constructive sensor), contact plus
mental appreciation of its import: For reasons which will now be shown
or guessed at, whether the defendant's knowledge is actual or implied is an
important distinction upon which depends the result of man' cases in
this field. It has been held that actual knowledge is not the sole basis
for the applicability of the last clear chance doctrine. There are cases in
which a defendant, who never conceived of the existence of the plaintiff
until the impact, became liable for that negligent plaintiff's injury. The
defendant does not have an actual last clear chance to avoid impact because
until the impact he did not know of the plaintiff's presence. At best he
has a constructive last clear chncc implied by law. Whatever might
29. Id., 2 So.2d at 587.
30. See note 23 spra.
31. See note 24 supra.
32. '[he cases in Florida involving plaintiff's position of inextricability (in fra)
do not discuss the question of whether plaintiff was actually seen by defendant. As
will be shown, discovery is not significant to this group of cases. Plaintiffs, inextricably
helpless, recover without their being actually discovered, so that the conclusion in the
text is an a fortiori case.
33. See language used in Davis v. Cuesta, note 13 supra.
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be the justification for an actual last clear chance doctrine-whether it be
sympathy for the observed plaintiff or whether the quality of negligence
of an observing defendant who, having seen his victim in time to prevent
impact and fails to do so-it is markedly different from ordinary instances
of negligence and there is no such justification to countenance the existence
of a constructive last clear chance doctrine.
The superior opportunity of the defendant that hitherto marked the
basis for application of last clear chance does not and cannot exist where
defendant never saw or heard the plaintiff. By using the fact that the
defendant, had he been aware of his surroundings, could have perceived
the plaintiff and thus would have had the last clear chance, is to place on
the defendant a greater burden of care than is placed on the plaintiff.
For is it not the case that had the plaintiff exercised due care for his own
safety he also could have avoided the impact?
There is no reason, where the defendant did not actually become
aware of the plaintiff's existence, to change the general rule that a negligent
plaintiff cannot recover froni a negligent defendant.
The Florida court does not allow a negligent plaintiff to recover from
a negligent defendant who might have had a last clear chance in every
case. Before applying the constructive last clear chance doctrine the posi-
tion of the plaintiff is taken into account.
The negligence of the plaintiff call leave him in two types of situa-
tions:
(1) Where he is unable to extricate himself from his position of
danger by the exercise of due care.
(2) Where he has placed himself in a position of danger by his
inattentiveness to his environs or by a mistake in judgment but would be
able to extricate himself were he to exercise due care.
The particular situations in which a negligent plaintiff happens to
find himself determines as to whether he can recover under the doctrine
of last clear chance when lie has not been observed.
It would appear that the court should have taken great care to distin-
guish between these two situations. Although it is perfectly clear that the
difference in situations is recognized and that the plaintiff's recovery is
determined thereby, it is just as clear that little effort has been made to
use the words suggesting each of these positions.
The Florida court has had inordinate fondness for the terms "peril",
"perilous situation", etc. It might be thought that these words would
connote the position of plaintiff's inextricability. However, they are not
used as words of art to describe either of the plaintiff's two positions.
Rather, they are used in their ordinary usage to mean "danger". Such
words, therefore, are meaningless unless further modified, for it is not the
fact that the negligent plaintiff is in danger that is significant, but whether
or not he is able to extricate himself from this danger.
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At times "peril" is used in conjunction with other words to describe
a situation of inextricability as in the case of Merchants' Transportation v.
Daniel: "A situation of peril from which the exercise of ordinary care on
his part would not thereafter extricate him. 13 4  The word "dangerous",
meaningless in itself to describe either situation, is also coupled with the
concept of inextricability by the use of modifications, as: "A helpless and
dangerous situation" in Miller v. Ungar.35
The difficulty is greater when in such cases as Lindsay v. Thomas0
the words signifying danger are used alternatively to mean both positions
of extricability and inextricability. In Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co.3 the
court used "peril" to describe a position where plaintiff was merely inatten-
tive.
The greatest difficulty is that, by the use of these ill-defining words, the
courts have made decisions concerning the plaintiff's two positions which
are not completely clear, and the results tend to become clouded by the
constant repetition of words meaning one thing at one time and some-
thing else at another.
In this article the word "inextricable" is used to describe the position
where the plaintiff cannot undo the result of his own negligence by the
exercise of due care. Further, in this article, where the negligent plaintiff
is able to extricate himself from his position, he is described as being
inattentive or as having used bad judgment.
The courts have had more success in expressing the concept of the
situation where the plaintiff can extricate himself before impact by his
own exercise of due care. Although, as shown, this position has been
referred to as a "perilous position", it has also been referred to as one
where the plaintiff "had a chance to escape the injury by himself exercising
ordinary diligence and did nothing to extricate himself from danger." 8
This is a perfect description and leaves nothing to be desired. Further, to
describe this position the courts have stated it to be one where the
plaintiff's "contributory negligence continues until the collision."-",
These words are used consistently to describe the single situation
of the plaintiff's danger and his ability to extricate himself through the use
of due care. These words further provide a good contrast to the phrase
"plaintiff's negligence ceased"40 which is sometimes used to express the
position of inextricability,
If this language were to be used only as a symbol to identify the two
34. 109 Fla. 496, 504, 149 So. 401, 403, 404 (1933).
35. 149 Fla. 79, 5 So.2d 598 (1941).
36. 128 Fla. 293, 174 So. 418 (1937).
37. See note 28 supra.
38. 109 Fla. 496, 504, 149 So. 401, 403 (1933).
39. Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co., 147 Fla. 320, 2 So.2d 586 (1941); Davis v.
Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471, 1 So.2d 475 (1941); Merchants' Transportation Co. v. Daniel.
109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933).
40. Miller v. Ungar, 149 Fla. 79, 5 So.2d 599 (1942), and other cases cited in
this article.
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positions, the consistent use of phraseology involving the cessation of
negligence (meaning the inextricable position) or continuity of negligence
(meaning the other situation) might be looked upon with favor.
However, this language is not used consistently or to the exclusion
of more geieral and abstract teninology. More important, the literal
meaning of the words makes its use untenable. In last clear chance cases
the negligence of the plaintiff never "ceases" and it is always "concurrent".
Consider this situation: A driver in an automobile is negligently stalled
in the path of an oncoming train. The engineer of the train negligently
fails to keep a lookout, and does not see the stalled automobile, thereby
depriving himself of the opportunity of avoiding the accident, which could
have been avoided had the engineer used due care. In the ensuing impact
the driver is injured, as well as several passengers on the train. For
purposes of the suit by the driver against the railroad company, the driver's
negligence in reference to the last clear chance doctrine will be said not
to have "continued" up to the moment of impact but to have "ceased"
because the driver was unable to extricate himself from his position by
using due care. However, in a suit by the passengers against the driver,
can the driver urge that his negligence had ceased when the impact occurred
and therefore lie is not liable to the passengers? Obviously not. A plaintiff
who has negligently placed himself in an inextricable position, as well
as a plaintiff who has negligently made a mistake in judgment or who has
negligently failed to be attentive, has created a risk of harm to himself
and others, and this negligence continues until the impact.
When the court attempts to describe the position of the plaintiff
it should do so by the use of such words as inextricability or helplessness
on the one hand, and possibly inattentiveness on the other, to more
accurately describe the two situations into which the plaintiff's negligence
has led him.
The Florida Supreme Court has, except in a few cases, held that
where the plaintiff is inattentivc lie can recover if actually seen but can-
not if not actually seen.
The first expression on this point is to be found in the leading case
of Merchants' Transportation Co. v. Daniel in the dictum. There it was
stated:
Defendant. had it so requested would have been entitled to a
charge that if simultaneously with the defendant's negligence the
deceased had a chance to escape the injury by himself exercising
ordinary diligence and did nothing to extricate himself from danger
the doctrine of "last clear chance" would not apply. This is so
because in that case deceased would have been guilty of concurrent
negligence which is a form of contributory negligence that bars
recovery.4
From this time, with few exceptions, the court has refused to allow
41. 109 Fla. 496, 505, 149 So. 401, 404 (1933).
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the application of the last clear chance doctrine for the benefit of all unseen,
inattentive plaintiff.
In Davis v. Cuesta two cars approached an intersection, one from the
cast (the plaintiff), and the other from the south:
No warnings were sounded by either. Neither slackened his speed
nor materially altered the course of their [sic] vehicle. The impact
came by the defendant's car striking the middle or rear of the
plaintiff's.
42
The lower court refused to charge the jury on the doctrine of last clear
chance and from an adverse judgment plaintiff appealed. The high
court affirmed in a unanimous en bane decision. It seems apparent that
the defendant never saw the plaintiff's car. It is also apparent that plaintiff
was negligent and that his negligence can be regarded as "concurrent" or
"as having continued until the moment of impact." For this reason, the
fact that the defendant never actually saw the plaintiff negates the applica-
bility of the doctrine of last clear chance.
49
A case expressing the same principle was Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co.
44
The Florida Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court's decision, stated:
The plaintiff must, in addition to showing the defendant was
negligent in failing to avert the accident after knowledge of the
situation, in sufficient time to act upon it, show that his negligence
did not continue up to the moment of the injury and was not a
contributing and efficient cause of it.",
In Turner v. Seegar8" a small boy stepped into the street. He was hit
by an oncoming car but "was not observed by appellee (defendant) until
the moment of the impact. "47  The lower court's decision not to charge
on the doctrine of last clear chance48 was upheld. In this case the boy was
not in an inextricable position. He was merely inattentive to the traffic.
The plaintiff not having been seen, the defendant was not culpable and the
decision in Davis v. Cuesta was followed.
In these cases, 4 the court refused application of the doctrine of last
42. 146 Fla. 471, 472, 1 So.2d 475, 476 (1941).
43. "Yet in invoking the benefit of the rule the plaintiff has another hurdle to
make, that is, to show that he was free from concurring negligence . ... Therefore
if his contributory negligence continued until the collision he cannot avail...."
)avis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471, 473, 1 So.2d 475, 476 (1941).
44. 147 Fla. 320, 2 So.2d 586 (1941).
45. Id. at 323, 2 So.2d at 587.
46. 151 Fla. 643, 10 So.2d 320 (1942).
47. ld., 10 So.2d at 321 (1942).
48. "'The purpose of this rule of law is to require persons to continue the exercise
of due care for his fellow man's safety after it is apparent that the latter has by his
own neglect placed himself in danger. The facts of this case made no such case."
Turner v. Seegar, 151 Fla. 643, 646, 10 So.2d 320, 321 (1942).
49. For other Florida cases on this principle see also Becker v. Blum, 142 Fla.
60, 194 So. 275 (1940), where the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the lower court's
action in refusing to charge on last clear chance when the plaintiff was inattentive,
(not in a position of helplessness) and there was no proof that the defendant saw him.
In Humphries v. Boersma, 190 F.2d 843, (5th Cir. 1951), the plaintiff was inatten-
tively crossing the street, and neither the plaintiff, nor the oncoming driver saw the
other until the instant of impact. It was held that in order for last clear chance to
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clear chance and followed the general rule that a negligent plaintiff cannot
recover from a defendant.
However, the feelings that perhaps motivated the adoption of last
clear chance were at play throughout. Consequently, in situations similar
to those mentioned above, where a defendant should have discovered an
inattentive plaintiff, but did not, the court has occasionally compensated the
plaintiff. In these cases, more than in any others, it is extremely difficult
to understand the judicial motivation as being anything more than an
outright desire to aid a stricken plaintiff for, in addition to lacking a
clear basis for application of last clear chance, these cases fly in the faces
of closely analagous precedents.
In the case of Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Hall,10 the plaintiff's auto-
mobile collided at an intersection with the defendant's truck. It is pos-
sible that plaintiff was not negligent, but since the case is decided on a
theory of last clear chance it must be assumed she was.51 At best the
plaintiff made a mistake in judgment or was inattentive. The facts clearly
negate the possibility of her having been placed in a helpless position.
There was no evidence to show that the defendant actually saw the plaintiff.
Since both parties were negligently inattentive, neither seeing the other,
the case should have followed Davis v. Cuesta. However, the court held:
The doctrine of last clear chance was developed in aid of the
injured party in cases like this. The defendant was 150 to 175
feet north of the intersection when the plaintiff moved into it and
could have avoided the accident if he had been as cautious as the
plaintiff was.52
In Brandt v. Dodd5" the jury was charged in substance that, if the
plaintiff was negligent in getting himself into a position in which be was
unable to extricate himself in the exercise of due care, he might neverthe-
less recover if the defendant saw or should have seen the plaintiff and
could have avoided the accident by using due care. Although the charge
might have been correct under other circumstances, the facts of the case
did not warrant any instruction on last clear chance. There was no evi-
dence to indicate that the plaintiff was helpless. The plaintiff was struck
by defendant's automobile while crossing a street and while the defendant-
driver was temporarily blinded by lights of cars coming from the opposite
direction. On its facts, this was a case where the plaintiff was either
apply there would have to be a finding that "the driver of the car saw Ithe plaintiff]
while she was crossing the street so that she could have prevented striking her."
50. 158 Fla. 549, 29 So.2d 624 (1947).
51. "The case apparently was determined by the jury upon the basis of con-
tributory negligence of appellant [plaintiff] which his request for a charge upon the
doctrine of the 'last clear chance' presupposes." Yousko v. Vogt, 63 So.2d 193, 194
(Fla. 1953).
52. 158 Fla. 549, 550, 29 So.2d 624, 625 (1947). Perhaps the decision in this
case was somewhat influenced by Mr. justice Terrell's strong feelings about the size of
the death toll on our highways. The bulk of the opinion is a biting editorial on the
wayward conduct of our present day motorists.
53. 150 Fla. 635, 8 So.2d 471 (1942).
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inattentive or using bad judgment. Since lie was not actually discovered
this case belongs in the category represented by Davis v. Cuesta.4
The tendency of the Florida Supreme Court to be overgenerous in favor
of negligent plaintiffs, as exhibited by the Hall case and the Brandt case,
seems to have been definitively spiked by the recent case of Yousko v.
54. Brandt v. Dodd also illustrates the principle that under some circumstances a
driver may have to use a greater aniount of care towards a pedestrian. 'f'his principle,
when used in connection with the constructive last clear chance doctrine, is a further
aid to recovery on the part of a negligent plaintiff.
Although by the weight of authority the standard of care required of both pedes-
trians and drivers of automobiles is the same-the care an ordinary and prudent person
would use under the circumstances of the particular situation concerned-the amount
of care required of each party toward the other may be greater as the circumstances
vary. An ordinary prudent person, having in his control a potentially destructive and
dangerous instrumentality, should use the amount of care commensurate with the
nature of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Carter v. I. Ray Co.,
83 la. 470, 91 So. 893 (1921). Since the Florida Supreme Court has characterized
the automobile as a dangerous instrumentality, Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson,
80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920), the court, to follow a line of logical consistency,
should require more care to be used by a motor vehicle driver. Railway Express
Agency v. Brabban, 62 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1953). The court has done so despite any
such explicit pronouncement on the subject.
The court has reiterated constantly that the rights of pedestrians and motor
vehicle operators are reciprocal. Robb v. Pike, 119 Fla. 823, 161 So. 732 (1935);
Prior v. Pounds, 113 Fla. 308, 151 So. 890 (1934); Florida Motor Transportation v.
Hillman, 87 Fla. 512, 101 So. 31 (1924). Such a statement actually embodies two
concepts. The first is that neither the pedestrian nor the driver can claim the use
of the highway to the exclusion of the other. More important is the second con-
comitant of the reciprocal rights rule: the pedestrian and the motor vehicle driver, who
are on the highway, must use ordinary care to avoid harm to the other under the
circumstances. Thus, the standard of care is that required of the ordinary prudent
man; but the ordinary prudent man who is manipulating a dangerous agency, like an
automobile along the highway, may have to use a greater quantum of care to achieve
that status of prudency and caution than his equally careful brother who is walking
along the same highway.
"\While both parties are charged only with the exercise of the same
degree of care it is manifest that the amount of care by law exacted of the
driver of the motor vehicle is far greater than the amount exacted of the foot
passenger." Raymond v. Hill, 168 Cal. 473, 143 Pac. 743, 747 (1914).
This principle juxtaposed with the last clear chance doctrine is a further aid to
recovery against the driver by a pedestrian who is in an inextricable position. Under
the constructive last clear chance doctrine, a negligent plaintiff who is in a position
of inextricability and who is never discovered by the defendant may nevertheless recover
if it can be established that the defendant should have discovered the plaintiff and
that the defendant could have avoided the accident by using due care had such dis-
covery been made. It is clear that in some cases had a driver been using that amount
of care that was required of him under the circumstances, such care would have enabled
him to discover the plaintiff in his helpless condition. Once this is established and it
is further shown that the defendant had an opportunity to avoid the accident but
failed to do so, the plaintiff's recovery is assured.
In Brandt v. Dodd, the plaintiff, while crossing a busy street, was struck by the
defendant's car when the defendant was temporarily blinded by lights from cars
coming from the other direction. The defendant contended that the testimony offered
at the trial did not justify the court in charging the jury on the last clear chance
docrine, apparently urging that there was no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff
was in an inextricable position (although this was not discussed at all in the opinion),
and apparently also contending that there was no evidence tending to show that
the defendant saw the plaintiff or could have seen the plaintiff by exercising due care.
Earlier in the opinion the court had quoted with approval the following statement
from Mathers v. Botsford, 86 Fla. 40, 97 So. 282 (1923):
While it may be negligence for a driver of an automobile to permit the
bright lights on his car to obscure or obstruct the vision of a driver of another
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Vogt.5  In this case there was also an intersection collision. It was specif-
ically stated that neither of the parties saw the other until impact. The neg-
ligence of the plaintiff resulted from a mistake in judgment or inattentive-
ness which did not place him in a position of inextricability, or, in the
language of the court, "evidence showed that negligence on each party
litigant was concurrent. In such a situation the doctrine of last clear
chance is not applicable. Merchants' Transportation Co. v. Daniel, supra
and cases therein cited."50
It is noteworthy that the only two authorities cited in the Yousko
decision are those of the Merchants' Transportation Co. v. Daniel and
Davis v. Cuesta. Those two cases have clearly and explicitly laid down
the rule that the doctrine of constructive last clear chance will not apply
where the plaintiff was not in a position of inextricability, or in the court's
words, when his negligence was "concurrent". It is to be hoped that the
Yousko case will mark a return to a more satisfactory application of the
last clear chance doctrine, and that such cases as the Hall and the Brandt
cases will not be followed.
Just as it now seems apparent that where the defendant did not
actually see the plaintiff and appreciate his position, he is not liable where
the plaintiff is merely inattentive or has made a mistake in judgment, it is
equally apparent that a defendant in the identical position will be forced
to compensate a plaintiff if the latter's position can be characterized as
being helpless or inextricable.
In Miller v. Ungara the facts were these: A young plaintiff was riding
car on a public highway, yet this does not relieve the driver of the other car
of the duty to stop if that is reasonably required to avoid injury to persons
who may lawfully be on the road, but whose presence is not known to the
driver because of the blinding light on another vehicle then approaching.
In answer to defendant's contention that it was error to charge the jury on last
clear chance the court went on to state: "The automobile is a dangerous instrumen-
tality when in operation on public streets, and under certain circumstances under which
he approached the area the driver of the car was required to exercise the proper care
for pedestrians lawfully about the area and to stop his car, or reduce the speed, or wait
until his vision was clear, so the safety of others lawfully in the area would not be
jeopardized. The impact occurred at a time when the driver's vision was impaired.
Dr. Dodd was carried several feet on the fender of the car, when the car could have
been earlier brought to a stop if the proper care and caution had been exercised by the
driver." 158 Fla. 635. 8 So.2d 471., (1942).
Thus, in the proper situation, a helpless plaintiff who has never been discovered
has another string to his bow when urging the application of the constructive last
clear chance doctrine. He may validly contend that under certain circumstances a
great amount of care is required of a motor vehicle driver. If the plaintiff could have
been discoveed had the requisite caution been used, the way is paved toward the
application of the unconscious last clear chance doctrine.
55. 63 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1953).
56. 63 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1953). Hobson, C.J., at page 194, advances this warning
to both the judge and defendant's advocate: "A trial judge when faced with a request
for a charge upon the doctrine of the 'last clear chance' should be extremely cautious.
Such a charge should never be given unless the evidence clearly demonstrates its
applicability. It this be not true, the giving of such a charge would either work an
advantage to the plaintiff to which he would not be entitled or at least would tend
to confuse, rather than aid, the jury in the performance of its duty."
57. 149 Fla. 79, 5 So.2d 598 (1941).
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a bicycle on a busy thoroughfare. The defendant's truck was being driven
on a street at five miles per hour. Visibility was poor. The plaintiff,
seeing the truck became confused and fell, and was apparently unable
to get out of the way of the truck from that point on. The defendant's
driver "did not see plaintiff before the injury." The case came to the
high court on the plaintiff's assigned error of the lower court's refusal
to charge on the doctrine of last clear chance. In a split (4-2) decision the
supreme court reversed:
In the case at bar the jury should be permitted to determine
whether plaintiff's negligence ceased when he fell to the street.5
Interpreting this judicial language, the theory is derived that if the
negligence "ceased" (that is, not that there was no negligence, but that
the negligent plaintiff found himself in peril and unable to extricate
himself from the consequences of his negligence), the fact that the
defendant did not see the plaintiff is legally immaterial.
The facts of this case were distinguished from cases where actual
visual contact on the part of a defendant was required, as in Davis v.
Cuesta, on the ground that in those cases the plaintiff's negligence as a
matter of law continued until the impact; that is, the plaintiff was not in
an inextricable position but was inattentive or was acting under a mistake
in judgment.
The dissenting opinion does not impose the duty of actual sight on
the defendant where, as here, the plaintiff is in an inextricable and helpless
position. Rather the dissent only points out that, in order for last clear
chance to apply, the defendant, if he did not see the plaintiff, should have
been in a position where he "in the exercise of proper care ought to have
seen' '1 the plaintiff, and that the burden of proving same was on the
plaintiff.60
In Kenan v. Withers6' the plaintiff was, by her own negligence, in a
position of inextricability when, in crossing a railroad track, the gate
closed in front of her, preventing her from removing herself and her car
from the railroad track. There was no discussion of whether she was
actually seen. The court held that despite negligence of both sides, the
plaintiff and her husband could recover because of the application of the
last clear chance doctrine. It seems that the underlying basis of the
case is that since the plaintiff was in a helpless position the court need
look only to what the defendant should have seen and done were it exercis-
ing due care throughout.
The Federal Court, interpreting the Florida law in Consumer's Lumber
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. If a defendant neither saw the negligent plaintiff, nor should he have seen
him, he would have neither an actual nor a constructive last Clear chance to prevent
the impact, and is therefore not liable to the negligent plaintiff.
61. 137 Fla. 561, 188 So. 95 (1939).
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and Veneer Co. u. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,62 further points out that where
the plaintiff is in a helpless position he may recover regardless of whether
he is actually seen by the defendant.
As previously indicated, to apply the doctrine of last clear chance
where the plaintiff was never seen is logically unjustifiable. Logical justi-
fication, even though the unseen plaintiff is not merely inattentive but is in
an inextricable position, is still lacking, and to apply the doctrine on his
behalf indicates an unwarranted solicitude for him.
Further, examination of the results of the last two groups of cases
shows, strangely enough, the liability of the defendant is controlled not
by his own acts alone, but by the purely fortuitous fact of what the
plaintiff's position happens to have been when he was struck.
However, in certain respects it is consistent to find the courts denying
relief to an inattentive and unseen plaintiff but affording relief to a help-
less and unseen plaintiff. The demand upon the judicial sympathy which
underlies this entire field is obviously greater when the plaintiff is so
enmeshed by his own negligence that he cannot aid himself. On this
basis the doctrine of constructive last clear chance should be closely
confined to those cases where the plaintiff is inextricably helpless.
There is, however, no reason for applying the last clear chance doctrine
even to the group of unseen but helpless plaintiffs, other than the greater
feeling of sympathy for these plaintiffs. Reason and logic would seem
to demand that recovery be denied to unseen plaintiffs regardless of the
position to which their own negligence has brought them.
SUMMARY
The introduction of a last clear chance doctrine, either "actual" or
"constructive", into the law of contributory negligence had no rational
basis. The conception of such a doctrine seems to have stemmed from
a number of intuitive feelings favoring a negligent plaintiff who, but for
this doctrine, would be denied recovery. A semi-expressed feeling that
failure to utilize an actual last clear chance to avoid injury partakes
somewhat of wantonness or wilfulness, as well as an unexpressed hostility
to the rule that one who has been contributorily negligent is barred com-
pletely from recovery, stands behind every case in which a defendant
bcomes liable tinder the doctrine. If the law were modified so that
negligent plaintiffs and negligent defendants shared the loss according
to their respective fault, the doctrine of last clear chance will have out-
lived any usefulness that it might have. "The doctrine has been called a
transitional one, a way station on the road to apportionment of damages."63-
The Florida Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has established the doctrine
and forged its basic elements.
Essential to the application of the doctrine in any situation are the
62. 117 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1941).
63, PROSSER ON TORTS 410 (1941).
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following requirements: negligence of both the plaintiff and the defend-
ant; appreciation of the danger of the plaintiff, either actual, or such
appreciation as a reasonable man would have under the circumstances;
and an opportunity to avoid the accident by the use of due care after
the moment of actual discovery, or after the moment when discovery
would have been made if due care had been used.
Under the actual last clear chance doctrine, when the plaintiff is
actually discovered lie may recover regardless of the position to which
his own negligence has led him.
Under the constructive last clear chance doctrine, when the plaintiff
is never discovered he may recover only if his negligence has led him to a
position from which he could not extricate himself.
While the Florida Supreme Court may have exhibited some tendency
in the past to extend the constructive last clear chance doctrine to the
situation where the plaintiff's position was that of inattentiveness, the
most recent expression of the court on the subject shows that that tendency
has been summarily abandoned.
Nevertheless, the last clear chance doctrine as it exists in Florida
remains a great source of comfort to plaintiffs, whose recovery, because
of their negligence, would normally be denied.
